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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AT THE
MARGIN OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Arthur Manuel*
Nicole Schabus**
In the 1999 Human Development Report, which uses data from 1996
and 1997, Canada was ranked first among the 174 countries included
in the report, and had the highest over all Human Development Index
[HDI] score. Calculating HDI scores for Registered Indians, including
those living on and off reserve, reveals a substantially lower HDI
score for the Registered Indian population, which would be ranked
about forty-eighth among the countries in the report.1

I.

INTRODUCTION: A WIDE RANGE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Over the last three decades, Indigenous Peoples around the
world have won important constitutional recognition of their
inherent rights and jurisdiction. Yet, despite these gains, the
socio-economic status of Indigenous Peoples has not improved
and they continue to be the poorest populations of those countries
* Arthur Manuel is a member of the Secwepemc Nation, in the South-Central Interior of
British Columbia, Canada. He served as Chief of the Neskonlith Indian Band for eight
years and as Chairperson for the Shuswap Nation Tribal Council for seven years. He also
headed the Interior Alliance and currently serves as volunteer Chairperson for the
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade (INET). This paper is an ongoing case
study and portions have been borrowed from an unpublished conference paper entitled
Aboriginal Peoples v. Companies And Governments: Who are the Real Stewards of the
Land and Forests? Growing International Understanding of Indigenous Proprietary
Interests, submitted for the New York University’s Conference on Indigenous Peoples and
Multilateral Trade Regimes: Navigating New Opportunities for Advocacy (May 2002).
** Nicole Schabus holds Master Degrees in Law and International Business
Administration from the University of Vienna. She is working on her PhD in Law with a
grant from the Austrian Academy of Science. Nicole is practicing law and has been called
to the bar in British Columbia. he continues to work as a volunteer for INET.
1 Dan Beavon & Martin Cooke, An Application of the United Nations Human
Development Index to Registered Indians in Canada, 1996, in ABORIGINAL CONDITIONS:
RESEARCH AS A FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC POLICY 207 (Jerry P. White et al. eds., 2003). In
the past decade, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development
Index (HDI) has become one of the most commonly cited and used indices of well-being.
Canada has consistently scored at or near the top of the United Nations’ ranking of
countries based on the HDI scores. Id.
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in which they live. This socio-economic status is perpetuated
partly because, despite certain gains, many governments still
refuse to implement constitutional provisions recognizing the
rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, the 1990s saw an
unprecedented consolidation of international trade law with the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the
signing of important global and international trade agreements.
This consolidation undermines the rights of Indigenous Peoples
around the globe by increasing corporate access to both land and
resources held by Indigenous Peoples and it serves to perpetuate
an already tenuous socio-economic status.
This article is a case study into the historic and ongoing
efforts of Aboriginal Peoples from the Interior of British
Columbia to secure the recognition and implementation of their
land rights. It will be argued that the real property interest of
Indigenous Peoples should be valued over the alleged quasiproprietary interests of corporations. Unlike so many state
governments, Indigenous Peoples have never ceded their
sovereignty through accession to free trade agreements. Because
Indigenous Peoples still maintain legally recognizable property
rights, this article argues that Indigenous Peoples are in a
unique position to challenge corporate control over their land and
resources under the current international law regime.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC MARGINALIZATION OF
THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF CANADA
A.

Indian Reserves: The “Fourth World” Inside the “First
World”

The United Nations Development Program first published its
Human Development Index in 1990.2 Since then Canada has
always been ranked on or near the top.3 This high ranking
indicates that Canada would be one of the best countries in the
world in which to live.4 However, if you are an indigenous person
born in Canada, statistics show that you would likely not be
living at Canada’s much touted high level of development.5
Instead, you would be living at a much lower level of
development.6 This is especially true among registered Indians
living on reserves in Canada whose living conditions, on average,

2
3
4
5
6

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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are below living conditions found in developing countries.7
Living conditions on Canadian Indian reserves are ranked at the
same level as a country with a rank of seventy-eight on the
Human Development Index.8
The situation in the United States is similar. A recent study
conducted by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development found that “reservation Indians perennially have
been the poorest identifiable group in the United States.
American Indian/Alaska Native families on and off reservation
are two-and-a-half times more likely than the average American
family to live in poverty, and the situation is worse for families
on reservations.”9 Yet the Harvard Study also found that “the
era of self-determination has brought progress, [given that]
Indian nations have had a long way to go in terms of their
economic development.”10
Addressing tribal sovereignty, the study went on to state:
Supported by every U.S. President since the 1960s and bolstered, for a
time, by a combination of federal court rulings and congressional
policies, tribal self-rule – sovereignty – has proven to be the only policy
that has shown concrete success in breaking debilitating economic
dependence on federal spending programs and replenishing the social
and cultural fabric that can support vibrant and healthy communities
and families.11

The study further notes that tribal sovereignty is
increasingly under attack by the courts and congressional bills
that want to abolish the tribes’ economic and legal
When Indigenous Peoples first started
independence.12
organizing at the international level during the 1970s, they
vowed to work together to overcome their socio-economic
marginalization through recognition of their inherent rights.
They called themselves the “Fourth World Movement,” in
reference to the fact that Indigenous Peoples are the poorest
peoples in the world.13

Id.
Id. at 208.
Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, Joint Occasional Papers on
Native Affairs No. 2004-03, at 35 (2004), available at http://www.jopna.net/pubs/JOP
NA06_MythsandRealities.pdf.
10 Id. (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 1.
12 Id. at 7.
13 See GEORGE MANUEL & MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN
REALITY (1974).
7
8
9
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The Underlying Problem: Constitutional Breaches in Canada
and the United States

Tribal sovereignty and the right to control tribal lands was
first recognized in a series of cases known as the Marshall
trilogy.14 The first case, Johnson v. McIntosh, decided in 1823,
found that Indian title to land was compatible with U.S. property
law and could only be extinguished by the federal government.15
One decade later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the state of
Georgia attempted to oust the Cherokee from their traditional
territories within the state despite a treaty with the federal
government of the United States.16 The Cherokee took their case
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, who found them to be
“domestic dependent nations.”17 Just one year later, in Worcester
v. Georgia, the Court found that the Cherokee had not
surrendered their right to self-government through contact with
the colonial powers, and still had the power to remain in and
govern their territory.18
President Andrew Jackson did not agree with the Worcester
decision and is said to have stated: “John Marshall made his
decision; let him enforce it now if he can.”19 President Jackson
ordered the removal of the Cherokee in an act of unconstitutional
defiance against the Supreme Court ruling.20 Known as the Trail
of Tears, the forced march of nearly 17,000 Cherokee from
northern Georgia to present-day Oklahoma resulted in the
deaths of over 4,000 Cherokee.21
The U.S. policy of removal was followed by equally cruel and
destructive policies including the making and subsequent
breaching of treaties with Indian populations until 1871, the
practice of assimilation and allotment until 1928, reorganization
until 1942; and termination until 1968.22 All of these policies
were aimed at destroying and undermining the very fabric of
Native American Tribes and their control over their tribal lands.
14 The Marshall trilogy consists of the following three cases, decided by Chief Justice
John Marshall in the early 1800s: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832).
15 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592-93.
16 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 3.
17 Id. at 17.
18 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61.
19 JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 255
(1988).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 391.
22 For more information on these different U.S. policies see United States
Environmental Protection Agency Tribal Training Resource Guide 29-38 (2004), available
at http://www.epa.gov/indian/resource/modules/entire.pdf.
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Still, Native Americans organized themselves in opposition to
these policies. In 1953, tribal leaders in the northwest formed
the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (Affiliated Tribes), an
organization dedicated to tribal sovereignty and selfThe Affiliated Tribes finally secured the
determination.23
recognition and implementation of their tribal sovereignty in the
late 1960s, with their own authorities taking control over the
administration of tribal affairs and the extraction of resources
from tribal lands.24
In their paper Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The
Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, Joseph Kalt and Joseph
Singer detail how important strengthening tribal sovereignty is:
[S]overeignty holds the prospect of being a win-win strategy for all
contending parties. Obviously, tribes are winners by their own
standards – as they demonstrate daily by pushing unerringly for selfrule. But states and the federal government stand to gain as well, as
tribes make economic and social progress, contribute to their local and
regional economies, and take pressure off of state and federal budgets
otherwise needed to fight problems of poverty and social disarray.25

While the policy in the United States leaves some room for
Native American tribes to slowly close the gap and overcome
poverty amongst their peoples, the policy in Canada remains the
This policy of
extinguishment of Aboriginal Title.26
extinguishments, similar to the earlier US policy of termination,
contributes to the inability of the Indigenous Peoples to regain
their economic independence.27 In many ways, Canada is now
facing in the twentieth century the same choice the United
States faced in the 1830s. Canada must choose to either
recognize the judicially prescribed and constitutionally supported
proprietary interests of Aboriginal Peoples, or it can continue its
unconstitutional policy of extinguishing Aboriginal land rights.
23 See Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, available at http://www.atnitribes.org
/about.html.
24 See Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat For Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and
Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279 (2000)
25 Kalt & Singer, supra note 9, at 41.
26 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Comprehensive Claims Policy and
Status of Claims (2003), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ps/clm/brieft_e.html.
27 Beavon & Cooke, supra note 1. Canada has created an elaborate system of federal
spending and funding programs for numerous Indian bands and tribal organizations.
These programs not only contribute to the economic dependence of Indigenous People, but
they help to perpetuate poverty on Indian reserves. For example, in 1996 the GDP per
capita for an average Canadian amounted to $ 22,480. Id. at 208. In contrast, the GDP
per capita for a registered Indian living on reserve amounted to $8,720, almost one third
the national average. Id. For more information on the Canadian spending and funding
programs see Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 5 Report of the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples § 2 (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/
sgmm_e.html.
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In the 1997 decision, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal Title as the
collective proprietary interests of Aboriginal Peoples in their
traditional territories.28 The decision applies to all territories
where no treaties between the Crown and the Indigenous Peoples
had been entered into, with British Columbia being the largest
area effected..29 In most provinces east of the Rockies historic
treaties were signed, but the debate about their implementation
continues. Many Indigenous Peoples argue that the “spirit and
intent” of the treaties also ensures indigenous control over their
traditional territories. Aboriginal nations and organizations are
now pressuring Canadian provincial governments to recognize
the Aboriginal sovereignty enshrined in these treaties and to
right past breaches of these historic documents.30
In British Columbia on the other hand, a number of
Aboriginal nations in the Interior refuse to enter into any type of
agreement that would extinguish their inherent land rights
and/or limit their sovereignty.31 Instead, these nations continue
to fight for the recognition of their land rights and their right to
control traditional territories.32 These rights were recognized in
Delgamuukw in which the Court called for the Canadian
government to enter into negotiations based on the recognition of
Aboriginal Title:
Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into
and conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through
negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides,
reinforced by the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I
stated in Vander Peet, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(1) – “the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the
sovereignty of the Crown.” Let us face it, we are all here to stay.33
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1014 (Can.) (stating “aboriginal title is held communally.”).
Id. at 1014-15.
Id. at 37-43.
See Bernard Schulmann, Getting Treaty Talks Off Square One, POLICY OPTIONS,
Oct. 2000, at 60, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct00/schulman.pdf.
32 See e.g. Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (Can.).
33 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1123-24 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Lamer
references Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution as the basis for the coexistence of
Aboriginal sovereignty and the sovereignty of the Crown. Id. Section 35 is part of the
new Canadian Constitution that came into force in 1982. See CAN. CONST. § 35 (1982).
Prior to that, Canada’s Constitution was enshrined in a treaty with the United Kingdom
entitled the 1867 British North America Act. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867), § 30 &
31 Victoria, c. 3.
In the early 1980s, Prime Minister Trudeau wanted to “patriate” the Constitution,
making it a solely Canadian Act and leaving its amendment to federal parliament and the
provinces. He also wanted to introduce the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enshrining
individual civil rights in the Constitution. At the same time, he attempted to remove any
reference to Indigenous Peoples and their collective rights from the Constitution. It was
because of this that Aboriginal nations from across Canada were opposed to the patriation
of the Constitution. Led by Indigenous Peoples from British Columbia who rented a train
28
29
30
31
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The first and most important paragraph of Section 35 of the
1982 Canadian Constitution reads “[t]he existing aboriginal and
treaty rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada are hereby
This provision constitutes the
recognized and affirmed.”34
unconditional recognition of Aboriginal rights and extends
constitutional protection to them. Many Indigenous Peoples also
consider Section 35 the source for Aboriginal jurisdiction, placing
it on equal footing with federal and provincial jurisdiction.
However, since its enactment in 1982, the Canadian government
has refused to implement Section 35 so that it has arguably
become nothing more than an “empty box.”35
In conjunction with its reductionist reading of Section 35, the
federal government has also refused to revoke its land rights
policy entitled the Comprehensive Claims Policy.
Taking
advantage of the Supreme Court of Canada’s divisive position on
Aboriginal Title in the 1973 case Calder v. British Columbia,36
the federal government devised the Comprehensive Claims Policy
in order to accomplish the “blanket extinguishment” of
Aboriginal Title.37 Following the recognition of Aboriginal rights
in the Constitution of 1982, this policy of extinguishment should
have been revoked or reformed. It was not. Today, Aboriginal
Peoples from across British Columbia continue to reject this
federal policy. For example, in 2000, all major provincial Indian
organizations in British Columbia signed the following
Consensus Statement:
that became known as the Constitution Express, they travelled to Ottawa to protest. A
year later, in 1981, they sent a delegation of indigenous leaders to England to stop the
patriation. As a result, Canada had to add Section 35 to the 1982 Canadian Constitution.
See generally George Egerton, Trudeau, God, and The Canadian Constitution: Religion,
Human Rights, and Government Authority in the Making of the 1982 Constitution, in
RETHINKING CHURCH, STATE, AND MODERNITY: CANADA BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA
(David Lyon and Marguerite Van Die eds., 2000); James Ross Hurley, The Canadian
Constitutional Debate: From the Death of the Meech Lake Accord of 1997 to the 1992
Referendum, Dec. 16, 1992, available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?
Language=E&Page=consfile&Sub=TheConstitutionalDebate; Union of British Columbia
Indian Chiefs, Constitutional Express, available at http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/conxprss.htm
(last modified Feb. 23, 2005).
34 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), Schedule B, c. 11, § 35.
35 For more information on this ongoing debate, see ARDITH EALKEM, BOX OF
TREASURES OR EMPTY BOX?: 20 YEARS OF SECTION 35 (2003).
36 Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). In Calder, three judges held
that the inherent land rights of Aboriginal Peoples had not been extinguished, three
judges found they had been, and the last judge dismissed the matter on a technicality. Id.
37 See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, supra note 26. Only a very limited
number of Aboriginal Nations from across Canada entered into negotiations with the
federal government. The only resulting agreements were the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement of 1975 and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement of 1978. See Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada, The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and
Northeastern Quebec Agreement, available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/info/info
14_e.html.
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The Assembly of First Nations, the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, the
Interior Alliance and the First Nations Summit, hereby join together
publicly to affirm the Aboriginal [T]itle and rights of all First Nations
of British Columbia and Canada. Canada’s Comprehensive Claims
Policy is predicated on the denial of our rights and title. We
categorically reject this policy and Canada’s implementation of this
policy. We call upon Canada to assert the honour of the Crown and to
adopt a new policy of recognition, affirmation and implementation of
Aboriginal [T]itle.38

Due to the failure of the federal and provincial governments
to take the necessary steps to implement Aboriginal rights, the
Supreme Court of Canada in a number of decisions throughout
the 1990s, began to give meaning to Section 35 and itself defined
the fiduciary obligation of the federal government with
Aboriginal Peoples.39 In 1997, in a unanimous judgment written
by Chief Justice Lamer in the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme
Court of Canada not only recognized Aboriginal Title, but also
held Aboriginal Title was protected by Section 35 of the
Canadian Constitution.40 Although Aboriginal Title is recognized
under Canadian law, the Court went further to define it as a sui
generis right, controlled by the indigenous laws of the respective
nation.41
This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada clearly
rendered the Comprehensive Claims Policy of 1986
unconstitutional. Yet, despite repeated calls by indigenous
leadership to adopt a new policy of recognition, affirmation and
implementation of Aboriginal Title, the federal government has
made it very clear that it has no intention of changing its policy
or its laws.42 This categorical refusal to honor Supreme Court
decisions defining constitutional rights amounts to the same type
of constitutional crisis sparked by President Andrew Jackson in
the 1830s. The Canadian federal government’s refusal to abide
by the constitutional rulings of the Supreme Court is also a blow
in the face of Aboriginal Peoples who have historically attempted
to work with the federal government to find a solution.
38 BUSINESS COUNCIL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE BRITISH COLUMBIA TREATY
PROCESS: A ROAD MAP FOR FURTHER PROGRESS (2004), available at http://www.bcbc.com/
archive/FinalTreatyPaper_may2004.pdf.
39 Amongst the most important decisions on Aboriginal rights in the 1990’s were R.
v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R 1075 (Can.); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); R.
v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (Can.).
40 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1010.
41 Id. at 1014.
42 Janice G.A.E. Switlo, In a Perfect World, at 10, at http://www.ualberta.ca/
NATIVESTUDIES/LegalPDF/In a perfect world.pdf (stating that a letter from Hon.
Robert Nault, Minister of Indian And Northern Affairs, to Phil Fontaine, National First
Nations Chief, that “Canada was not prepared to change the Comprehensive Land Claims
policy” in response to First Nation’s pressure.).
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For example, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
had the monumental task of shedding light on the history of
dispossession of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and making
recommendations to the federal government on how past wrongs
could be resolved.43 The commissioners concluded that current
levels of poverty and underdevelopment are directly linked to the
dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their lands and the delegitimization of their institutions of society and governance.44
The commissioners also concluded that land and governance
questions needed to be resolved in a meaningful way.45 The
entire last volume of the Royal Commission’s five-volume report
to the federal government was dedicated to the Commission’s
recommendations for possible resolution.46 In addition to its
comprehensive recommendations, the Royal Commission
highlighted the urgency and volatility of the situation and
emphasized the need for timely and fundamental changes.47
The federal government’s response to the Commission’s
efforts exemplifies the federal government’s unwillingness to
recognize Aboriginal Title and Rights. In “Gathering Strength,”
which speaks of “a renewed partnership with Aboriginal People
and governments,”48 and its response in “Agenda for Action with
First Nations,”49 the government claimed its willingness to
develop a partnership with Indigenous Peoples. Yet, the way the
government envisioned the “partnership,” Indigenous Peoples
would have had to recognize the existing land tenure system and
abide by the very policies that the Royal Commission so
emphatically discredited in its study.50 This “partnership” was
therefore nothing more than the government’s endorsement of
the status quo. Despite the efforts of the Royal Commission and
its subsequent findings, the federal government chose to continue
on as before and endorsed policies like the 1973 and 1986
See generally Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 27.
See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples §§ 11.2-11.4 (1996),
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e.html.
45 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 2 Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples §§ 4-6 (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/
sgmm_e.html.
46 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 5 Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (1996), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sgmm_e.
html.
47 See id. § 2.
48 Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Gathering Strength: Canada’s
Aboriginal Action Plan (1997), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/chg_e.html.
49 Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Agenda for Action with First
Nations (1998), available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/agn_e.html.
50 See generally ABORIGINAL RIGHTS COALITION, BLIND SPOTS: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (Patricia Sherlock ed., 2001).
43
44
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Comprehensive Claims Policies that subject its Indigenous
populations to subjugation and suffering.
C.

Continuing Violations of International Human Rights

The growing gap between the findings of the Royal
Commission and the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada on
the one hand, and the actions of the federal government on the
other, drew the attention of numerous international human
rights bodies.
In December of 1998, the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights presented its
concluding observations on the reports submitted by the
government of Canada pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.51 In its
report, the Committee made reference to the disparity between
the living conditions for non-indigenous and indigenous
Canadians:
3. The Committee notes that, for the past five years, Canada has been
ranked at the top of the United Nations Development Programme’s
Human Development Index (HDI). . . .
....
17. The Committee is greatly concerned at the gross disparity
between Aboriginal [P]eople and the majority of Canadians with
respect to the enjoyment of Covenant rights. There has been little or
no progress in the alleviation of social and economic deprivation
among Aboriginal [P]eople. . . .
18. The Committee views with concern the direct connection between
Aboriginal economic marginalization and the ongoing dispossession of
Aboriginal [P]eople from their lands, as recognized by RCAP, and
endorses the recommendations of RCAP that policies which violate
Aboriginal treaty obligations and the extinguishment, conversion or
giving up of Aboriginal rights and title should on no account be
pursued by the State Party. . . .52

The Committee, concerned about the poor standard of living
among Aboriginal Peoples, the inadequate food and housing, the
inadequate legal protection, and the mass unemployment, found
Canada to be in violation of the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.53 The following year, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee reviewed the fourth periodic report
submitted by Canada and came to similar conclusions:
The Committee notes that, as the State party acknowledged, the
situation of the [A]boriginal [P]eoples remains ‘the most pressing
51

See generally U.N. ESCOR, 19th Sess., 57th mtg. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.31

52
53

Id. at 2, 4.
Id. at 4.

(1998).
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human rights issue facing Canadians’. In this connection, the
Committee is particularly concerned that the State party has not yet
implemented the recommendations of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). With reference to the conclusion by RCAP
that without a greater share of lands and resources institutions of
aboriginal self-government will fail, the Committee emphasizes that
the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples
must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
and that they may not be deprived of their own means of
subsistence . . . .54

Since then, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has noted similar
concerns with regard to Canada’s policies on land rights and selfDespite repeated findings of human rights
government.55
violations regarding Indigenous Peoples in Canada, the
Canadian government has done nothing to act in accordance with
the recommendations of the various United Nations human
rights bodies.
D. Exploring Alternative Avenues
A growing number of Indigenous Nations from Canada are
attempting to draw the international community’s attention to
the federal government’s violations of international law.
Although international human rights bodies, such as the United
Nations, have repeatedly found Canada to be in violation of
international law, these bodies lack the power enforcing their
decisions at the international level.56 Thus, Indigenous Peoples
in Canada are now faced with the challenge of remedying the
constitutional crisis facing them and are attempting on their own
to right the wrongs recognized by international human rights
organizations.
One avenue considered by Indigenous Peoples and
organizations is a return to the Canadian courts for judicial
remedies. There are some Aboriginal Title and rights cases
currently underway before Canadian courts.57 However, it takes
over ten years and substantial funds for an Aboriginal Title case
to wind its way through the Canadian judicial system.
54 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, 65th Sess., at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999).
55 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., at 58, U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (2002).
56 See, e.g., U. N. ESCOR, supra note 51, at 2, 4.
57 See, e.g., Brian Thom, Rising to the Test: Meeting Lamer’s Tests for Aboriginal
Rights and Title After Delgamuukw, Meeting of the Canadian Anthropology Society, at
http://home.istar.ca/~bthom/tests.htm (May 1999) (discussing several recent cases
regarding Aboriginal Title.).
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Hampered by an inability to pay the necessary fees to
successfully win a judgment and the need for quicker resolution,
most Aboriginal Nations are unable to utilize the Canadian court
option.
A number of Indigenous Peoples, unable to wait ten years for
a resolution of their rights, have taken alternative actions to
assert and protect their Aboriginal Title. For example, many
Indigenous Peoples have actively tried to stop the exploitation of
natural resources on their lands by blocking access to mining and
In response, affected corporations seek
logging sites.58
injunctions, those are interim remedied in which the courts
weigh the economic loss of the corporations against the interests
Based on a minimal showing of
of Indigenous Peoples.59
hardship and often without a hearing, the injunctions are
granted. Once these injunctions are granted, Indigenous Nations
are then faced with a decision: obey the order or be found in
contempt of court.60 Unable to get the federal and provincial
governments to recognize their rights, Indigenous Peoples across
Canada now face criminal prosecution for exercising what the
Supreme Court of Canada has already deemed a constitutional
right.
Another avenue for Indigenous Peoples is to enlist the
international community. By lobbying for the international
recognition of indigenous rights, pointing to Canadian violations
of international human rights laws, and calling for the
enforcement of the financial and social responsibilities of
international corporations that are active on Indigenous lands,
the Indigenous Peoples of Canada strive to win recognition of
their Aboriginal Title and rights from the international
community.
III. CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: ASSERTING INDIGENOUS
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
As alluded to above, Indigenous Peoples adapt to changing
realities and use different avenues to maintain their inherent
rights. Indigenous rights, especially property rights, are sui
generis, defined by respective Indigenous laws, which maintain a
strong connection to traditional territories.61 Indigenous rights
are extremely multifaceted, containing social, cultural,
environmental and economic dimensions. Per their customs,
58 See Julia E. Lawn, The John Doe Injunction in Mass Protest Cases, 56 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 101 (1998).
59 See id. at 104.
60 See id.
61 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1014.
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Indigenous Peoples see and assert their rights in a holistic
manner. However, because of ever-changing political and legal
climates, Indigenous Peoples have been forced to venture into the
unchartered territory of international law to assert their
proprietary interests and win recognition of their inherent rights.
A.

How International Trade Agreements Threaten to
Undermine Indigenous Rights

The 1990s was an important decade in terms of recognition
of Indigenous rights, both in Canada and across the Americas.
Today, many new Latin American constitutions not only
recognize, but also protect Indigenous rights and jurisdictions.62
The 1990s also saw an increased strengthening of international
trade law regimes. One of the most significant was the creation
of the WTO and the passage of its new Dispute Settlement
Understanding, which strengthens sanctions and enforcement
mechanisms for international trade law.63
Yet, despite these gains, there were losses in the
international arena. In North America, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994
and proved to be a setback for the recognition of Indigenous
rights.64 The same day of its enactment, Indigenous Peoples in
the Southern Highlands of Mexico staged the Zapatista uprising
The reason for the protest lied in Mexico’s
in protest.65
elimination of all constitutional protections for collective
Indigenous land rights in order to comport with the membership
requirements of NAFTA.66 NAFTA secures increased corporate
access to natural resources and threatens to freeze
environmental, social, and human rights standards.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the Investor State Chapter, allows
international corporations to sue states for expropriation or loss
of their investments.67 If a regulation deprives a company of the
62 See Theodore McDonald, Indigenous Rights: Configuring Citizenships, REVISTA:
HARVARD REVIEW OF LATIN AMERICA (2003), available at http://drclas.fas.
harvard.edu/revista/tcontents_issue.php?issue=15&article=291; North American Free
Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 289.
63 For more information on the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, please
visit http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.
64 See WILLIAM J. DAVEY, PINE & SWINE: CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: THE FTA EXPERIENCE AND NAFTA PROSPECTS 2 (1996).
65 See Amelia M. DeAngelis, Note, Coffee, Mexico’s Other Bean: An Examination of
the Globalization of the Coffee Industry, its Impact on Mexican Villages, and the
Possibility of Surviving the Grind, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 887 (2004). See also
http://www.abstractdynamics.org/archives/2004/01/02/zapatista_nafta.html.
66 Id.
67 North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1110,
32 I.L.M. 289.
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right to profit from its investment, or even invest in the first
place, the foreign corporation is entitled to fair market value
compensation for the “expropriation” of its profits.68 NAFTA
provisions on investment and the rights of investors contained in
Chapter 11 not only grant preferential treatment to foreign
investors but also guarantees them the right to invest despite
domestic laws and regulations. Moreover, in the case of a change
in public policy (i.e. environmental protection) corporations can
claim expropriation for the mere loss of opportunities.69 Thus,
foreign investors now have the ability to sue countries where
they have lost profits, or have been prohibited from investing in
the first place, even where domestic companies could not do the
same.70
As a result of international trade agreements like NAFTA,
Indigenous Peoples are in direct competition with multinational
corporations for control over their lands. While multinational
firms can sue even for the expropriation of future profits,
Indigenous Peoples still have not been able to secure the
implementation of their ancestral land rights.
Indigenous
Peoples are still fighting to stop the expropriation and third
party alienation of their lands and resources. Unfortunately,
Indigenous Peoples are fighting this fight without much in the
way of ammunition. With no remuneration rights and with few
efficient remedies available to enforce recognized rights,
Indigenous Peoples are fighting an uphill battle against the
illegal expropriation of their lands by multinational companies.
IV. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE: DEALING WITH
INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS
A.

The Perspective of the Indigenous Peoples of British
Columbia

The Indigenous Peoples of the South Central Interior of
British Columbia have never given up their land rights. Even as
far back as 1910, the Indian tribes of the Interior of British
Columbia gathered to call upon the then Prime Minister of
Canada, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to recognize their proprietary
interests:
Id.
For example, on August 25, 2000, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal ordered the
government of Mexico to pay an American company, Metalclad, almost seventeen million
U.S. dollars because a Mexican community refused to allow the company to operate a
waste disposal site on ecologically sensitive land. Stephen L. Kass & Jean McCarroll, The
‘Metalclad’ Decision Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., October 27, 2000, at 3.
70 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 67, arts. 1115-38.
68
69
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The whites made a government in Victoria . . . . At this time they did
not deny the Indian tribes owned the whole country and everything in
it. . . . We trusted the whites and waited patiently for their chiefs to
declare their intentions toward us and our lands. . . . They told us to
have no fear, the queen’s laws would prevail in this country, and
everything would be well for the Indians here. . . . They let us think
this would be done soon . . . .71

They also made it very clear that they did not accept reservations
as a replacement for their rights to the land:
This was their proposal not ours, and we never accepted these
reservations as settlement for anything, nor did we sign any papers or
make any treaties about same. They thought we would be satisfied
with this, but we never have been satisfied and never will be until we
get our rights.72

When the Supreme Court of Canada finally recognized
Aboriginal Title in 1997,73 Indigenous Peoples in the Interior of
British Columbia celebrated.
Expectations were that the
Canadian government would act promptly to implement the
Supreme Court decision, just as the government of Australia had
done by passing the Native Title Act one year after its High
Court recognized inherent Indigenous land rights.74 The Interior
Alliance, an organization consisting of Interior Tribes of British
Columbia, called on the federal and provincial governments to
As discussed
recognize and implement Aboriginal Title.75
previously, that recognition and implementation never came. So
in 1999, the leaders of the Interior Tribes decided that it was
time to take action.
B.

Attacking the Lumber Industry: The Fight in British
Columbia

The dominant industry in the Interior of British Columbia is
forestry,76 and, for the past 50 years, the majority of land tenure
has been allocated to large integrated wood-processing
The
corporations holding long-term renewable licenses.77
71 Memorial from the Chiefs of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of
British Columbia, to Sir Wilfrid Laurier 3 (August 25, 1910), available at http://www.sec
wepemc.org/memorial.htm.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1014.
74 See Mabo v. Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
75 See Richard Cowan, Environmentalists, Tribes Seek Duties on Canada Lumbar,
Canada Forest Conservation News & Information, available at http://forests.org/archive
/canada/entrseek.htm (May 11, 2001).
76 British Columbia Ministry of Management Services, British Columbia
Manufacturing Shipments 1997-2004, available at http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/dd/
handout/mannaics.pdf (showing that wood and paper make up over 50% of British
Columbia’s manufacturing shipments).
77 Roland Stiven, Social Involvement in Forestry: Eight Cases Studies from British
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recognition of Aboriginal Title would therefore require a major
reallocation of land tenure away from these corporations. To win
recognition of proprietary rights in the lumber industry would
not only equate recognition of Aboriginal Title but would also
serve to protect the natural resources Indigenous Peoples have
relied on for so long.
In their efforts to assert Aboriginal Title via the lumber
industry, some Indian Nations issued logging permits pursuant
to their jurisdiction under Section 35 of the Canadian
Constitution.78 These permits allowed the permit holder to log on
a small cut block according to the highest environmental
standards. No provincial permits were acquired. In September
1999, a number of Indian bands, including the Adams Lake,
Neskonlith and Spallumcheen Indian bands, went logging with
the authorization and in the name of their Secwepemc Nation.79
Similarly the Okanagan Indian Band went logging in the name
of the Okanagan Nation. The province of British Columbia
charged them with stealing the timber.80 In return, the Indian
bands brought a defense, arguing that they had property rights
in the timber and asserted Aboriginal Title as their defense.81
The case regarding the property rights of Interior Tribes over
timber will be heard in the British Columbia Supreme Court in
2006. While the final outcome is years away, the Aboriginal
Peoples have already won one major battle in British Columbia v.
Okanagan Indian Band.82 Due to the socio-economic status of
many of the tribes involved, the Indian bands argued that they
were not in a financial position to properly fight a case of
substantial national importance.83 The British Columbia Court
of Appeal agreed.84
The Court held that the provincial
government would have to pay for the Indian plaintiffs’ legal
costs.85 The Supreme Court of Canada, finding the case to be of
national importance, upheld the cost decision.86
Yet, with no final ruling in sight and an initial trial set to
Columbia and Quebec, The Caledonia Centre for Social Development, at
http://www.caledonia.org.uk/socialland/canada.htm (Aug. 2000).
78 Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution guarantees Aboriginal rights.
See
Richard Spaulding, Peoples as National Minorities: A Review of Will Kymlicka’s
Arguments for Aboriginal Rights from a Self-Determination Perspective, 47 U. TORONTO
L.J. 35 (1997).
79 British Columbia v. Jules, [2001] 92 C.R.R. 2d 319.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371.
83 Id. at 373.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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start seven years after the logging took place, the issue of who
controls the forests of British Columbia might be sidelined in the
Canadian courts for decades. During this time, the integrated
wood processing corporations, with government support, may
continue to exploit and potentially exhaust the forestry resources
in the respective Indigenous territories.
Therefore, while
Indigenous Peoples continue to seek recognition of their
Aboriginal Title and rights in the Canadian Courts, they
continue to look for other avenues through which they can assert
and protect their property rights.
C.

Beyond British Columbia: The Fight Against the Lumber
Industry and the United States

The Interior Alliance, deciding to take its struggle to the
international level, turned to the United States. The U.S. is the
main export market for timber and lumber from Canada, with a
major share originating from the Interior of British Columbia.87
The year 2000, when representatives of the Interior Tribes first
headed to the United States, was just the right year to start
discussing forestry imports from Canada and the associated
violations of Indigenous rights.
The Softwood Lumber
Agreement imposing export quotas on Canadian lumber
producers, entered into force on April 1, 1996, was set to expire
on March 31, 2001.88
In 2000, it was already clear that both countries wanted the
quota system to end and that the Softwood Lumber Agreement
would not be extended. Canadian producers were pushing for
free trade in lumber and unlimited access to the U.S. market.89
The U.S. lumber industry, claiming injury from cheap Canadian
lumber imports, pushed Senators from the most affected U.S.
states for a stronger stand on Canadian lumber imports and
fundamental changes in the land tenure and wood allocation
system.90 Environmental groups that opposed clear-cutting and
87 The Interior of British Columbia is not only a stronghold of Aboriginal Title, but it
is also the heartland of softwood lumber exploitation. Canadian softwood lumber exports
to the United States amount to over six billion dollars annually, making it the singlelargest trade good between the two countries. See International Trade Canada, Softwood
Lumber, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/intro-en.asp (last modified March
26, 2004). More than 40% of the exports come from British Columbia, and the majority of
that lumber originates from the traditional territories of Indigenous Peoples in the
Interior. See British Columbia Ministry of Management Services, supra note 76. See also
Greg Mastel, Stopping the Giveaway of Canada’s Forests: Establishing True Free Trade in
Softwood Lumber (Oct. 2000), at http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/
Pub_File_628_1.pdf.
88 See Greg Mastel, supra note 87, at 8.
89 Id.
90 Sign on Letter from United State Senate to US Department Of Commerce and
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forestry practices in Canada supported this position.91
Groups from Canada and the United States submitted their
concerns in response to a call for positions regarding the
Softwood Lumber Agreement issued by the U.S. Trade
Representative.92
For the first time in the history of
international trade disputes, Indigenous Nations from Canada
also submitted their positions.93 The Interior Alliance made a
submission based on Aboriginal Title to their traditional
territories, detailing the refusal of the Canadian government to
let them share in the management of the land and its resources.94
At the same time, the Interior Alliance also lobbied the U.S.
Congress, which was more understanding of the threats to
Indigenous rights than the Canadian government had ever been.
The co-chairs of the Human Rights Caucus of the House of
Representatives circulated a special sign-on letter entitled
“Canadian Logging Threatens First Nations Habitats: Support
Native Peoples’ Right for Self-Determination in Canada.”95 This
letter stated “[i]t appears that while (Native) rights are being
defined in the court system that Canadian logging companies are
trampling them by clear-cutting these forest areas for profit, at
the same time eviscerating valuable wildlife habitat and
medicinal plants that are used by these people.”96

United States Trade Representative, (July 17, 2000) (on file with author).
91 See, e.g., Letter from Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, et al., to The Hon. Marc
Racicot, Special Ambassador, U.S./Canada Softwood Lumber (February 13, 2002),
available
at
http://albertawilderness.ca/News/NR2002/NR020213/LET020213NKNB/
LET020213NKNB.htm.
92 Request for Public Comment Regarding Softwood Lumber Practices in Canada
and Softwood Lumber Trade Between the United States and Canada, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, 65 Fed. Reg. 11363 (2000).
93 It was important for Indigenous Peoples to be involved in the U.S.-Canada
Softwood Lumber Dispute because it touched the core of their livelihood and deeply
impacted their Aboriginal Title and rights. Canadian softwood lumber imports also
impact Native American tribes in the United States: through self-determination and selfrule many tribes, especially those in the Pacific Northwest, have gained control over
forestry on their lands. Those tribes have developed sustainable forest management
practices that make it impossible for them to compete with cheap Canadian lumber
imports that neither take into account Indigenous rights nor environmental standards
when harvested. See, e.g., Ernie Atencio, After a Heavy Harvest and a Death, Navajo
Forestry Realigns with Culture, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, available at http://www.hcn.org/
servlets/hcn.URLRemapper/1994/oct31/dir/wr4.html (stating that BIA’s interest in Indian
self-determination has led to the Navajo Indians saving the rest of their forests).
94 See Canadian First Nations Join Together in Washington, DC to Present Views on
Softwood Lumber Agreement, KAHTOU NEWS, May 2000, available at http://www.
kahtou.com/images/lumber.html.
95 Sign-on Letter from Tom Lantos et al., entitled Canadian Logging Threatens First
Nations Habitats: Support Native Peoples’ Right for Self-Determination in Canada (2000)
(on file with author).
96 Id.
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D. The Softwood Lumber Dispute: United States v. Canada
The U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute has been one of
the most contentious trade issues between these two neighboring
countries in the past few decades.97 In the early 1980s, the U.S.
lumber industry organized under the Coalition for Fair Lumber
Imports (CFLI).98 CFLI argued that the Canadian government
was, through non-competitive allocation, subsidizing the timber
production of Canadian producers.99 At issue was “whether fees
charged by provincial authorities to lumber firms to harvest trees
on public land (stumpage rights) [were] artificially low and
constitute[d] countervailable subsidies.”100 In response to CFLI’s
contentions, the U.S. Department of Commerce investigated and
found that the actions of the provincial governments might be
inflicting material injury on U.S. industry.101 In what is known
as Softwood Lumber I, the Department of Commerce found that
stumpage was a good but was unable to conclude that the
Canadian government significantly subsidized its industry.102
The U.S. lumber industry was undeterred, however, and
brought another complaint in 1986: Softwood Lumber II.103 Due
to changes in its interpretation of U.S. countervailing duties law,
the Department of Commerce departed from its decision three
years earlier and found “Canada’s timber pricing and allocation
policies [did] constitute a countervailable subsidy.”104 Facing a
preliminary decision to impose a provincial duty of fifteen
percent or more, the Canadian government entered a last minute
agreement in December 1986 which imposed a fifteen percent
97 Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Volume 142, Issue
11, November 2, 2004, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/senate/
deb-e/011db_2004-11-02-E.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1 (statement from Hon. Jack
Austin stating that “[g]iven the dependence of the British Columbia economy on the
United States market, the long dispute with the lumber industry in the United States
over their trade protectionism and claims of harm to their industry goes on and on and
continues to damage B.C. interests and Canada-United States trade relations.”).
98 GEORGE HOBERG & PAUL HOWE, LAW, KNOWLEDGE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS IN
TRADE DISPUTES: THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER CASE 4 (Univ. of British Columbia, Inst. of Int’l
Relations, Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at http://www.iir.ubc.ca/
pdffiles/webwp29.pdf.
99 See Letter from Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports to Undersecretary of
Commerce Grant Aldonas and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Peter Allgeler (June 16,
2003), available at http://www.ftlc.org/index.cfm?Section=2&DownloadID=79 (discussing
need for negotiations on subsidized and dumped Canadian lumber).
100 Gilbert Gagne, The NAFTA and the Softwood Lumber Dispute: What Kind of
Canada-U.S. Partnership? 3 (November 2002), at http://www.unites.uqam.ca/gric/pdf/
Cahier_Gagne.pdf.
101 Id. at 12.
102 Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations on Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983).
103 Gilbert Gagne, supra note 100, at 7.
104 Id. at 8.
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export tax on all softwood lumber exported to the U.S.105 After
this agreement expired in 1991, another countervailing duty
investigation was launched. In 1992, following the conclusion of
its investigation, the Department of Commerce imposed a six and
a half percent duty on Canadian imports.106
Canada launched three appeals against the duty
determination, including one under the terms of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),107 but no decision was
ever adopted or publicized. This was primarily due to the weak
dispute settlement procedures that were then in place. At that
time, two bi-national panels had been set up under the CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) – one to look at the
question of injury, another to look at the question of subsidies.108
Due to a lack of evidence, neither panel agreed with the decisions
of the U.S. authorities and sent the cases back for further
consideration.109
The Department of Commerce maintained its decision to
impose a duty on Canadian imports.110 After the bi-national
panel rejected it once more, the Department of Commerce
resorted to a procedure provided for in the CUSFTA, which
allowed it to bring its case before an Extraordinary Challenge
Voting along national lines, the Committee
Committee.111
rejected the U.S. appeal in 1994.112 The United States had to
rescind its countervailing duties and frustrations with the
partisan dispute settlement process were great.113
In 1994, when Canadian exports to the U.S. hit a record 16.4
billion board feet, the U.S. industry proclaimed its readiness to
launch another countervailing duty investigation.114 Instead, binational discussions between the U.S. and Canada were
launched in 1995 and an agreement, now known as the Softwood
Lumber Agreement, was reached. This agreement imposed a
quota system that allowed British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario,
and Quebec to export 14.7 billion board feet of lumber to the U.S.
Id.
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 (1992).
107 Gagne, supra note 100, at 9-11.
108 Id. at 11.
109 See id. at 12.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 13.
112 See DAVEY, supra note 64, at 232.
113 Gagne, supra note 100, at 13-14.
114 U.S.-Canada Trade Agreement Timeline, 1982-Present (Random Lengths
Publications, Inc.), March 29, 2005, at 7, available at http://www.randomlengths.com/
base.asp?s1=In_Depth&s2=U.S.-Canada_Trade_Dispute&s3=U.S.-Canada_Trade_Agree
ment_Timeline_1995-present.
105
106
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annually without penalty.115 The Softwood Lumber Agreement
went into effect on April 1, 1996 and expired on March 31,
2001.116 The following day, on April 1, 2001, the U.S. softwood
lumber industry, represented by CFLI, brought its petition
alleging that,
[t]he Government of Canada and Canadian provincial governments
are providing countervailable subsidies with respect to the export,
manufacture and production of softwood lumber (the “Subject
Merchandise”), within the meaning of Section 701 and 702(b) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (the “Tariff Act”), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 and
1671a(b).117

1.

First Indigenous Submissions to International Trade
Tribunals
In May 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce once again
began an investigation into softwood lumber imports from
This was the first
Canada (Softwood Lumber III).118
investigation into the subsidization of Canadian lumber since the
recognition of Aboriginal rights to land and resources in the
Delgamuukw Decision. Understanding the pressure that free
trade in natural resources was putting on Aboriginal lands and
economies, the Aboriginal Peoples of the Interior decided to
involve themselves in the dispute.
They filed substantive
submissions with the U.S. Department of Commerce, alleging
that the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title constituted a subsidy
under international trade law.119
The investigative authorities, although interested in this
novel issue, lacked both the expertise and the time to investigate
these additional subsidy claims in detail.
Instead, the
Department of Commerce found that the potential subsidies for
the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title and non-implementation
of treaties and environmental provisions would be included in the
overall market value: “[T]o the extent that Canadian lumber
companies are being provided with stumpage from provincial
governments, we are measuring that financial contribution in our
preliminary determination based upon a market rate for

Id. at 8.
Id.
Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties Pursuant to Section 731 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 as Amended, at 1, In Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, USITC Inv. No. A-122-838 (April 2, 2001), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/
casework/softwood/Common%20Volume.pdf.
118 See Gagne, supra note 100, at 20.
119 Charles M. Gastle, Shadows of a Talking Circle: Aboriginal Advocacy Before
International Institutions and Tribunals, at 31 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.esteycentre
.ca/Shadowsofatalkingcircle_final.pdf.
115
116
117
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stumpage.”120 The U.S. Department of Commerce then went on
to deliver its preliminary decision in the Softwood Lumber III
and imposed countervailing duties of 19.31 percent on all
Softwood Lumber Imports from Canada.121
Throughout Softwood Lumber III, Canada openly opposed
submissions by Indigenous Peoples, arguing that questions of
land rights had to be first dealt with in Canadian courts.122
Knowing that Aboriginal Title cases take decades to litigate, the
federal government was attempting to perpetuate its “business
as usual” approach: ignore the already constitutionally
recognized Aboriginal rights within the territories at issue and
encourage the exploitation of the natural resources by Canadian
companies. Aboriginal Peoples understood that they had to
continue to assert their rights in venues outside Canada in order
to stop the third party alienation and exploitation of their lands
and resources. Despite Canada’s attempt to block indigenous
participation in the Softwood Labor Dispute, organizations like
the Interior Alliance pressed on to ensure that their voices were
heard.
2.

Rejection of the “Business as Usual” Approach:
Strengthening the Indigenous Position in the Softwood
Labor Dispute
Interior Alliance’s position that it had a right to continue
participating in the Softwood Lumber Dispute despite Canada’s
opposition was strengthened by rulings of Canadian courts
rejecting Canada’s “business as usual” approach.” One such
decision, Haida Nation v. British Columbia, rendered on
February 27, 2002 by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia,
further defined Canada’s legal obligations towards Indigenous
Peoples.123 In its holding that indigenous interests have to be
accommodated and taken into account on a provincial level, the
Court inferred that indigenous rights must also be accounted for
on both the national and international level.124
The decision was especially relevant to the Softwood Lumber
Id. at 34.
Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination,
Preliminary Affirmative Political Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination:
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,186 (2001).
122 For more information on Canada’s opposition, see Arthur Manuel and Nicole
Schabus, Aboriginal Peoples v. Companies and Governments: Who are the Real Stewards
of the Land and Forests? 4 (2002), available at http://www.iiirm.org/publications/
Articles%20Reports%20Papers/NYU%20Trade%20Conference/SchabusManuel%20Forestry%20Paper.pdf.
123 [2002] B.C.A.C. Lexis 130 ¶¶ 58, 60.
124 Id. ¶ 58.
120
121
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Dispute and is deserving of brief discussion here. The case dealt
with the replacement of tree farm licenses and subsequent
transfer of lands to large forestry firms on Haida Gwaii.125 Haida
Gwaii is an island claimed in its totality by the Indigenous Haida
people who have lived there for many generations.126 The Haida,
claiming Aboriginal Title over the area, had always opposed any
grant of right over their land. For a number of years leading up
to the case, the Haida had consistently expressed their objections
to the Crown about the rate at which the old-growth forests of
Haida Gwaii were being logged, the methods of logging being
used, and the environmental effects of the logging on the land,
watersheds, fish, and wildlife.127
Yet, true to its “business as usual” policy, the Crown and
Weyerhauser Company Ltd., a named co-defendant in the Haida
Nation case, failed to recognize the proprietary interests of the
Haida. In its opinion, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
condemned this “business as usual” approach:
[T]he Crown Provincial and Weyerhaeuser were in breach of an
enforceable, legal and equitable duty to consult with the Haida people
and to seek an accommodation with them at the time when the
processes were under way for a replacement of T.F.L. 39 and Block 6
and for a transfer of T.F.L. 39 from MacMillan Bloedel to
Weyerhaeuser in the year 2000. That enforceable legal and equitable
duty has continued from then until the present time and will continue
until the Haida title and rights are determined by treaty or by a Court
of competent jurisdiction. . . .
....
However, I would grant a declaration to the petitioners that the
Crown Provincial and Weyerhaeuser have now, and had in 1999 and
2000, and earlier, a legally enforceable duty to the Haida people to
consult with them in good faith and to endeavour to seek workable
accommodations between the aboriginal interests of the Haida people,
on the one hand, and the short term and long term objectives of the
Crown and Weyerhaeuser to manage T.F.L. 39 and Block 6 in
accordance with the public interest, both aboriginal and nonaboriginal, on the other hand.128

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed the lower court’s ruling on a duty to consult with regard
to the Crown:
The government’s duty to consult with Aboriginal [P]eoples and
accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown.

125
126
127
128

Id. ¶¶ 20-23
Id.
Id.
Haida, [2002] B.C.A.C. Lexis 130, ¶¶ 58 & 60.
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....
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and
continues beyond formal claims resolution.129

The Supreme Court also held that the “honour of the Crown”
could not be delegated and the legal responsibility for
consultation and accommodation rested with the Crown.130 This
does not mean, however, that third parties can never be liable to
Aboriginal Peoples. The court found that “[t]he fact that third
parties are under no duty to consult or accommodate Aboriginal
concerns does not mean that they can never be liable to
Aboriginal [P]eoples.”131
The importance of this ruling to the Interior Nation’s
position with regard to the Softwood Lumber Dispute is clear. In
finding a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal Peoples,
the Supreme Court supported the argument that the Canadian
government’s refusal to recognize Aboriginal Title serves as a
subsidy for Canadian lumber companies. In other words, the
“honour of the Crown,” clearly mandates that the Canadian
government recognize the proprietary interests of Indigenous
Peoples. By failing to do so, the Canadian government is
subsidizing corporations, allowing them to bypass their
obligation of negotiation and remuneration. In other words, by
refusing to acknowledge Aboriginal Title, the Canadian
government is subsidizing an entire industry and making it
easier for Canadian companies to exploit the lands of Indigenous
Peoples.
V.

THE WTO: SETTING PRECEDENT ON SUBSIDIZATION

Since the preliminary determination of the U.S. Department
of Commerce in the Softwood Lumber Dispute, Canada has
brought the Softwood Lumber dispute before the international
trade tribunals.132 Dispute settlement panels have been set up
under both the WTO and NAFTA to address Canada’s
Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 522, 528.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 539.
In April 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce released its final determination
on subsidies and on dumping Canadian softwood lumber imports to the United States.
The Department imposed a countervailing duty of 19.34% and antidumping margins
ranging between 2.26 and 15.83. See Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545 (2002); Notice of Final Determination of Sales
at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg.
15,539 (2002). For more information on WTO disputes please visit the WTO Dispute
Settlement site at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm#2002.
129
130
131
132
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complaints.133 The first panel set up under the WTO addressed
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s preliminary determination
imposing countervailing duties on certain softwood lumber from
Canada. A second panel addressing the final countervailing duty
determination soon followed.
A.

Canada Arguing for Corporate Rights

The cases brought before the WTO by Canada disputing
subsidization of softwood lumber have created important
precedent as they were the first cases involving natural resource
exploitation brought under the WTO’s new Dispute Settlement
Understanding. In its complaints, the government of Canada
argued that the integrated wood-processing companies from
Canada had quasi-proprietary interests in the timber growing on
public lands in Aboriginal Title territories.134
Attempting to move the entire natural resource exploitation
sector outside the scope of countervailing duty investigations,
Canada argued in favor of timber harvesters:
Timber harvesters have the right to harvest timber from Crown lands
by virtue of their tenures or licenses; they do not pay stumpage
charges as remuneration to acquire this right. Rather, a “stumpage
charge” is a levy on the exercise of an existing right to harvest timber.
Stumpage charges are properly viewed as a form of revenue collection
that is the economic equivalent of a tax.135

Canada argued that there should not be remuneration for
the acquisition of the right to harvest timber.136 Instead of
remuneration for the provision of public timber, it contended that
it was merely collecting part of an economic rent, like a tax.137
Thus, companies that harvested the lumber could acquire limited
ownership through the general licensing agreement long before
they met all statutory requirements, including the payment of
stumpage.138 In other words, Canada tried to resurrect its
already rejected contention that stumpage could not be subject to
a countervailing duty because it was not a good.139 In doing so,
133 See DSB Establishes Panel to Examine Softwood Lumber Dispute, WTO NEWS,
Dec. 5, 2001, at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/dsb_5dec01_e.htm; Status
Report of Panel Proceedings: Active NAFTA Panel Reviews, at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=616 (last modified July 25, 2003).
134 See Report of the Dispute Settlement Panel: United States - Preliminary
Determinations With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, World Trade
Organization, Doc. No. WT/DS236/R (2002), ¶¶ 1.1-1.3 [hereinafter WTO Panel Report],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
135 Id. ¶ 4.117.
136 Id. ¶¶ 4.116-4.122.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 To reiterate, international trade tribunals have consistently found that stumpage

MANUEL FINAL

247

6/21/2005 6:48 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 8:222

the Canadian government was attempting to outmaneuver the
imposition of a countervailing duty and the application of the
WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.140
B.

Indigenous Peoples Make Their Case

In opposition to Canada’s arguments that integrated wood
processing companies had quasi-proprietary interests in the
timber on Aboriginal Title lands, the Interior Alliance argued in
its amicus curiae brief that there could be no transfer of
ownership until they had given their consent and received fair
remuneration.141 Again, the Indigenous Peoples of Canada were
forced to make their claim for Aboriginal Title and rights, despite
the fact that the Canadian Constitution and Supreme Court had
already recognized these rights. One of the reasons why the
Interior Alliance chose to once again make its case was the
pending reality that, if Canada’s arguments were accepted by the
WTO, it would have opened the way for free corporate access to
natural resources within the traditional territories of Indigenous
Peoples.142 Therefore, the Interior Alliance felt it needed to
submit its argument that the Canadian government’s refusal to
recognize Aboriginal Title constituted a subsidy.
Canada has always argued for a restrictive interpretation of
terms like “direct subsidies,” arguing that they could not be
payments in kind because they were not a financial
is a good. In three prior countervailing duty investigations covering softwood lumber
products from Canada, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that stumpage
programs involve the provision of a good. See Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determinations: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada , 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159,
24,167 (May 31, 1983); Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination:
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada , 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,457 (Oct. 22,
1986); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada , 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570, (May 28, 1992). In 1992, a GATT panel
rejected Canada’s contention that stumpage cannot be countervailing because it is not a
good. See United States –Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada,
GATT B.I.S.D., 40th Supp., (1993), at 358, ¶ 346-47 (Feb. 19, 1993), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/91lumber.asp.
140 For more information on the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm.
141 See Brief of Amici Curiae Interior Alliance Indigenous Nations, WTO Panel on US
– Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada
(No. DS-236) (2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interior Alliance Amicus Brief].
142 If Canada’s arguments had been accepted by the WTO, Aboriginal proprietary
interests would have gotten lost somewhere in the process of resource distribution and
would not form part of any economic equation or remuneration scheme. Under the guise
that they were simply collecting economic rent, the provinces could, in the future, have
continued to keep Indigenous Peoples out of all remuneration schemes. At present,
Aboriginal Peoples are not remunerated for their ownership and have not passed on their
ownership in the timber to the governments or companies. Therefore, those entities have
not acquired full ownership at any point in the licensing, harvesting and marketing
processes.
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contribution.143 Other countries, like the United States, have
argued the opposite: payments in kind can be the basis for a
direct subsidy.144 The WTO appellate body, in previous cases,
has also spoken on the issue, ruling against Canada and its
restrictive interpretation that payments must be in the form of
money: “[w]e, therefore, agree with the Panel that the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘payments’ in Article 9.1(c) encompasses
‘payments’ made in forms other than money, including revenue
foregone.”145 Accordingly, it is not necessary that the cost for the
reduced price of an input be born by the government.146 It is
deemed sufficient that such a transfer of resources takes place
“by virtue of governmental action.”147
The past position of the WTO applied perfectly to the issue of
an Aboriginal Title subsidy. The argument of the Indigenous
Peoples of Canada was that the federal government’s
Comprehensive Claims Policy was a subsidy.148 That policy,
along with its “business as usual” approach, constituted
government actions that allowed corporations to exploit natural
resources in the traditional territories of Indigenous Peoples
without remuneration.149 In other words, the policy of the
Canadian government conferred a benefit on Canadian
integrated wood processing corporations, amounting to what
many consider a subsidy.150
C.

Indigenous Peoples’ Precedent: Amicus Brief Accepted

The Interior Alliance’s submission to the WTO presented the
first ever substantive, rights-based Indigenous submission to an
international trade tribunal. In making its finding, the WTO
panel at the outset commented on its receipt of the amicus brief:
As a preliminary matter, we note that in the course of these
proceedings, we decided to accept for consideration one unsolicited
See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶¶ 4.26-4.29.
See id. ¶¶ 4.93-4.96.
Report of the Appellate Body: Canada - Measures Affecting The Importation Of
Milk And The Exportation Of Dairy Products, World Trade Organization, Doc. No.
WT/DS103/AB/R (1999), ¶ 112, available at http://docsonline.wto.org.
146 Id. ¶ 115.
147 Id. ¶ 116.
148 Interior Alliance Amicus Brief, supra note 141.
149 Id.
150 Further supporting the argument for the finding of a subsidy was the reality that
a sale of lumber resources by the province of British Columbia without accounting for the
revenue due to Indigenous Peoples directly contributed to the artificial undervaluing of
the resource. Interior Alliance Amicus Brief, supra note 141. The amicus curiae brief also
noted that the province of British Columbia had repeatedly refused to discuss revenue
sharing with the Interior Alliance and the federal government had refused to change its
Comprehensive Claims Policy that provides the Aboriginal Title subsidy to corporations.
Id.
143
144
145
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amicus curiae brief from a Canadian non-governmental organization,
the Interior Alliance. This brief was submitted to us prior to the first
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties and the parties and
third parties were given an opportunity to comment on this amicus
curiae brief.
After this meeting, we received three additional
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs. For reasons relating to the timing of
these submissions, we decided not to accept any of these later
briefs.151

The official acceptance of the first ever substantive
submission made by Indigenous Peoples to a WTO panel set an
important procedural precedent. Prior to its acceptance, the
WTO had rejected a number of amicus curiae briefs. The
acceptance of the amicus curiae brief was hailed as a great
breakthrough by non-governmental actors. While the ability to
provide additional legal and substantive information on behalf of
the Indigenous populations of Canada was important in and of
itself, perhaps one of the most important results was a
procedural one. In accepting the amicus brief, the WTO officially
circulated the brief to all parties and third parties for their
comments. By inviting comment on the brief, the WTO has
taken a step towards opening the dialogue between nations and
Indigenous Peoples, forcing countries who are parties to a WTO
action to acknowledge and respond to the Indigenous position.152
Of the five parties in the case, only two countries objected to
the acceptance of the brief. India objected on the grounds that
the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions in WTO panel
proceedings could open the door to industry. Its fear was that
corporations, who often have more resources than governments of
developing countries, could use the amicus curiae process to
undermine the arguments and position of sovereign nations.153
Not surprisingly, Canada also opposed the filing of the amicus
curiae brief, contradicting its earlier position that amicus curiae
briefs, usually filed in support of the government’s position,
should be considered. In the end, only the United States,
unopposed to the submission of the amicus curiae brief, actually
WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 7.2.
Another procedural element determined by the WTO’s acceptance of the brief was
the timeline for third party involvement. Following the resolution of this dispute,
Indigenous populations now know that, in WTO proceedings, third parties are only
actively involved until the end of the first hearing by the panel or upon the panel’s specific
request. Any briefs received after the first panel hearing (such as the three additional
briefs submitted in this case) will not be accepted.
153 Aboriginal Peoples involved in proceedings before the WTO have since made it
clear that they would not bring industry arguments, and that even if such arguments
where brought by an Indigenous group arguing commercial-industrial interests over
Aboriginal interests, they should be rejected. This was the case in the Softwood Lumber
Dispute where the Meadow Lake Tribal Council filed a submission relying on industry
arguments and the submission was rejected.
151
152
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acknowledged the substantive argument posed in the brief in its
second written submission to the panel.154
The acceptance of the amicus curiae brief did not end the
involvement of the Aboriginal Peoples in the WTO proceedings.
Unfortunately, the often-criticized lack of transparency of the
WTO, hurt Aboriginal participation and involvement in the
proceedings. For example, notification of the acceptance of their
brief was only sent to the State parties, not the Aboriginal
submitters. In addition, throughout the proceedings, Aboriginal
Peoples were forced to rely heavily on discussions and
information being passed on by other parties, especially third
parties.155 Despite some difficulty, the involvement of Aboriginal
Peoples in the WTO proceedings was historic in and of itself.
Almost more important was the ensuing communications that
resulted between Aboriginal Peoples and state parties. For the
first time, state parties had to conceptualize Aboriginal rights on
an international level, contributing to an important learning
process and a growing international awareness of Indigenous
proprietary interests.
The general outcome of the WTO’s investigation was also
encouraging for Aboriginal Peoples. In general, Aboriginal
Peoples support the finding of the WTO panel:
In sum, and in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) SCM Agreement, we
are of the view that where a government allows the exercise of
harvesting rights, it is providing standing timber to the harvesting
companies. From the perspective of the harvesting company the
situation is clear: most forest land is Crown land, and if the company
wants to cut the trees for processing or sale, it will need to enter into a
stumpage contract with the provincial government, under which it
will have to take on a number of obligations in addition to paying a
stumpage fee for the trees actually harvested.156

In other words, the WTO found that Canada was providing a
good through its present stumpage system. In so finding, the
WTO also found that Canada’s providing of this was a potential
subsidy against which countervailing duties could be levied in
measure of the benefit incurred by the industry.157
VI. CONCLUSION
It must be recognized, in light of the WTO’s holding, that
Indigenous Peoples believe they hold collective proprietary
WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 4.252-4.297.
Even states that usually support high transparency, such as the member states of
the European Union, often feel restricted by the rules and procedures of the WTO.
156 WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 7.18.
157 Id. ¶¶ 7.20-7.30.
154
155
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interests in their traditional territories. In other words, it is the
position of the Indigenous Peoples of Canada that Aboriginal
Title coexists with, and is not subsumed by, the Title of the
Crown. Aboriginal Peoples should therefore be part of the
decision making process over their land and resources, and
companies should also be required to remunerate Indigenous
Peoples’ proprietary interests.
Canada’s arguments against the recognition of Aboriginal
Title before the WTO and its own Courts illustrates just how
many provinces try to undermine the proprietary interests of
Aboriginal Peoples by strengthening commercial and industrial
interests. The provinces provide a benefit to companies in the
form of a good by facilitating the taking of title from Aboriginal
lands without requiring the consent of and remuneration to
Indigenous Peoples. In other words, the federal government
provides a subsidy through government action enshrined in its
policy of the non-recognition of Aboriginal Title, exonerating
companies from having to remunerate Indigenous proprietary
interests.
The first submissions by Aboriginal Nations from the
Interior of British Columbia to international trade tribunals,
along with the acceptance of their amicus curiae brief by the
WTO panel on the subsidization of softwood lumber, were
important first steps in recognizing Aboriginal Title and resource
rights. These first substantive Indigenous submissions have
opened the door for the debate of Indigenous rights at the
international level and for future Indigenous interventions in
trade disputes that impact their rights.
Since the WTO investigation, the Interior Alliance nations
were joined by a number of Aboriginal Nations from across
Canada. The platform for Indigenous rights has expanded to
both a national and international level and is now known as the
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade (INET).158 INET is
open to Indigenous nations that want to assert and protect their
rights to their lands and resources. As a platform that focuses on
the macro-economic dimension of Indigenous rights, INET is
working towards the fair and equitable recognition of Indigenous
proprietary interests in the global economy. Indigenous Peoples
must continue to assert their rights both within their respective
countries and on an international level in order to counter
current trends calling for increased corporate control.
By
involving themselves on an international front, Indigenous
158 For more information please visit http://www.indigenousnet.org/ or contact INET
at inet@earthlink.net.
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Peoples are hoping to not only win recognition of their
proprietary rights, but also be active participants in trade
negotiations impacting their lands and resources.

